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In this paper we show that wage inequality decreased in the Italian private 
sector, both in the upper and in the lower tail of the distribution, in the 
period 1993-2006. By applying a quantile decomposition procedure we find 
that the decrease of the 90/50 ratio is almost totally related to a negative 
coefficients component. As for the reduction of the 50/10 ratio, the quantile 
decomposition shows that it can be related to both the negative coefficients 
component and the residual component. We claim that that supply-demand 
interactions have to be considered as the main explanation for the falling 
educational wage premia that represent the driving force of the falling 90/50 
ratio. The reduction of the 50/10 ratio can be instead associated to the 
changes in the residual component -related to compositional effects-, to the 
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supply-demand of education, Italy.   2 
1. Introduction
♦ 
The analysis of changes in the distribution of wages has been an active research area in 
labour economics over the last thirty years, especially because of the steep increase of 
wage inequality and schooling premia in the United States and other Anglo-Saxon 
countries since the early 1980s (Bound and Johnson, 1992; Katz and Murphy, 1992). To a 
lesser extent, increases of the educational wage premia (EWP, henceforth) and wage 
inequality are also documented for other OECD countries (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 
1997). One of the most prominent explanation for inequality trends in the last decades is 
related to skill-biased technical change, i.e. demand for skilled workers increases because 
of technological change (Acemoglu, 2002). Further, Autor et al (2006) and Goos and 
Manning (2007) have proposed a refinement of the skill-biased technical change 
explanation to address the trends in wage polarization observed in the US and the UK 
since the nineties. The main intuition concerns the fact that new technologies are 
substitute to routine tasks, located in the middle of the wage distribution, complementary 
to non routine cognitive tasks and a priori uncorrelated to manual tasks, located 
respectively at the top and at the bottom of the job quality distribution. The new 
technologies are then responsible for the polarization trends, i.e. for the increase in the 
upper tail wage inequality (the 90/50 ratio) and for the decrease of the lower tail 
inequality (the 50/10). Other explanations have also been considered in the literature, 
such as the role of institutions (unions and minimum wages, as in Di Nardo, Fortin, 
Lemieux, 1996) and the role of the interactions between changes in the supply and the 
demand of education (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Card and Lemieux, 2001, among others).   
In this paper we show that the Italian labour market emerges as an interesting case in 
the analysis of wage inequality. Our analysis can be summarized in three main findings.  
First, using the Survey of the Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) of the Bank of Italy 
for the period 1993-2006, we point out that in the private sector the 90/10 ratio of net 
wages decreased by 13%, from 2.77 to 2.42, due to a decrease in both the 90/50 and 50/10 
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ratios. As far as we know, Italy is the only OECD country where wage inequality 
decreased over time.  
Second, to identify which forces have played a role for the decreasing wage inequality 
we implement a quantile decomposition procedure, developed by Machado and Mata 
(2005), Melly (2005), and Autor, Katz, Kerney (2005), which decomposes the changes of 
the wage distribution into changes in covariates, coefficients, and residual components. 
Applying a standard mincerian wage equation, where education, experience and gender 
are included as covariates, we point out that the decrease in the 90/50 inequality ratio is 
mainly driven by the negative coefficients component, while the decrease in the 50/10 
ratio is related to both a negative coefficients component and a residual component. For 
both the 90/50 and the 50/10 ratio the impact of the covariate component is negligible. 
The negative coefficients component is consistent with the falling educational wage 
premia observed over the period, as pointed out by Naticchioni, Ricci, Rustichelli (2009). 
Third, we provide explanations for the wage inequality trends and for the findings 
derived by means of the quantile decomposition. For the decrease of the 90/50 inequality 
ratio we show that it is mainly related to supply-demand interactions. Using the CES 
production approach (Card and Lemieux, 2001), we point out that the increase in relative 
supply of education has exerted a negative impact on relative wages, while the impact of 
the changes of the technical change –proxy for the demand for workers- is not statistically 
different from zero. As for the decrease in the 50/10 ratio, we identify three main 
explanations. First, the quantile decomposition pointed out that the decrease in the 50/10 
ratio is largely accounted for by the residual component (49%). We explain the impact of 
the residual component in the lower part of the wage distribution by means of a 
composition effect (Lemieux, 2002, 2006): the increase of educated workers at the bottom 
of the wage distribution have increased the dispersion of earnings, affecting the residual 
component. Second, we show that the changes in the job quality distribution offered by 
firms have played a role, since the demand for unskilled jobs decreased less than the 
demand for medium-skilled jobs. Third, we show that changes in tax regimes have had 
an effect on the lower part of the wage distribution, because of a reduction in tax effective 
rates.  
The paper is structured as follow. Section 2 presents a survey of the literature. Section 
3 introduces the data used in the paper as well as descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents 
the decomposition analysis, while section 5 gives the results. Explanations for the 
inequality trends are investigated in section 6 and section 7 concludes.    4 
2.  A survey of the empirical Literature  
Most of the theories proposed to explain observed trends in wage inequality for OECD 
countries emphasize the central role played by technical change and human capital 
accumulation (Acemoglu, 2002). Standard theories of skill biased technological change 
(SBTC, henceforth) predict that new technologies favour the relative demand for highly 
educated workers and, as a consequence, are associated to an increase of wage inequality. 
Katz and Murphy (1992) and Bound and Johnson (1992), for instance, show that the 
relative demand for more educated workers increased steadily during the 1970s and the 
1980s, while the growth in the relative supply did slowdown in the 1980s relative to the 
previous decade. Accordingly, the growth in the relative demand due to SBTC is greater 
than the increase in the relative supply, entailing a raise of wages for graduates.1  
Furthermore, recent empirical evidence shows that inequality trends are characterized 
by divergent patterns in the upper and in the lower tail of the wage distribution. An 
explanation for this evidence concerns the changes in the structure of the job quality 
distribution, as in Autor et al. (2006) and Goos and Manning (2007). Using detailed 
classification for occupations, these papers investigate the over time changes in 
employment shares along the occupation distribution, ranked by median wage per 
occupation. Moreover, using other data sources, such as the Dictionary of Occupational 
Titles (DOT) for the US, they provide evidence that cognitive skills are concentrated at 
the top of the job quality distribution, routine skills are instead required at the middle, 
and manual skills are located at the bottom. Autor et al. (2006) and Goos and Manning 
(2007) argue that new technologies are substitute to routine tasks, located in the middle of 
the wage distribution, complementary to non routine cognitive tasks and a priori 
uncorrelated to manual tasks, located respectively at the top and at the bottom of the job 
quality distribution. Hence, the technological change favours the employment growth for 
cognitive tasks in high paid jobs, while it decreases the employment in middling jobs 
where routine tasks are used. In this framework, the new technologies would be 
responsible for the increase in the upper tail wage inequality (the 90/50 ratio) and for the 
decrease of the lower tail inequality (the 50/10 ratio), observed for instance in the US 
case.  
These interpretations have not been easily extended to other European countries, 
where different degrees of adoption of new technologies and labour market institutions 
                                                 
1 The supply demand technology paradigm remains the main theoretical framework also when the analysis 
takes into account the whole wage distribution, and not only the mean wage differentials by educational 
groups (Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993).   5 
have produced a different wage dynamics with respect to Anglo-Saxon countries 
(Gottshalk and Smeeding, 1997). For instance, using data from different sources Pereira e 
Martins (2004) analyze the impact of education upon wage inequality in fifteen European 
countries during the period from 1980 to 1995. By means of quantile regressions, four 
different patterns emerge: i) a positive increasing contribution of education on wage 
inequality in Portugal; ii) a positive and stable effect of education on inequality in 
Austria, Finland, France, Spain, Sweden, Ireland; iii) a neutral role in Denmark and Italy; 
and iv) a negative impact in Greece. Analogously, Barth and Lucifora (2004) provide a 
comparative study on the relationship between wage inequality, market forces and 
institutions for 12 European countries for the period 1984-2003. They show that the 
increase of educational levels closely matched the shifts of the relative demand for skilled 
workers driven by technological change, and this should explain why in some countries 
the wage premia for education either rose moderately or remained basically stable.  
H o w e v e r ,  r e c e n t  p a p e r s  h a v e  c h a l l e n g e d  t h e  v i e w  t h a t  S B T C  i s  n o t  a  p e r v a s i v e  
phenomenon in European countries. Dustmann et al. (2008) showed that job polarization 
is one the main explanations for the increase in wage inequality in the upper tail of the 
distribution in Germany, similarly to the US and UK cases. This finding is also consistent 
with Goos et al (2009), who point out that job polarizations trends are occurring in most 
of the European countries in the period 1993-2006.  
As for the Italian case, the paper that addresses wage inequality trends for a very long 
time period is Brandolini, Cipollone and Sestito (2002), which use the survey SHIW of the 
Bank of Italy to investigate the dynamics of inequality of net wages from 1977 to 1998. 
This paper points out that the distribution of net wages narrowed from 1977 to the end of 
the 1980s, mainly due to a wage indexation mechanism (the so-called “Scala Mobile”) 
that granted a flat-sum wage increase correlated to the increase in the cost of living index. 
At the beginning of the nineties, the important economic crisis and the reform concerning 
the abolition of the wage indexation mechanism (in 1992) generated an increase in 
earning inequality, which mainly took place between 1991 and 1993, as also stressed by 
Manacorda (2004). Then, from 1993 to 1998 Brandolini, Cipollone and Sestito (2002) argue 
that wage inequality remained basically unchanged. More recent papers have extended 
the period of analysis to 2002, using SHIW data. Lilla (2005) argues that in the period 
1998-2002 inequality indexes concerning net wages slightly increased, both in the 
between and within component. Another paper of Boeri and Brandolini (2004) 
investigates the evolution of inequalities in Italy, both of incomes and wage, using SHIW 
data. They claim that the distribution shifted, between 1993 and 2002, to the advantage of   6 
the households of self-employed, managers and retired persons, and to the disadvantages 
of households of production and clerical workers. 
The dynamics of wage inequality in Italy has been also investigated using the social 
security contribution data, the INPS employer-employee dataset. This data source has the 
advantage to have information on gross wages, much more observations per year and a 
longitudinal dimension, while it has the drawback that there is no information 
concerning education and that it covers only the private sectors. Using this dataset, 
Devicienti (2003) shows that in the period 1985-1996 wage inequality increased slightly, 
especially in the period 1992-1993, as in the SHIW data.  
As far as the literature concerning education and wages, Brunello, Comi and Lucifora 
(2001) estimated the average returns to schooling by applying least square and 
instrumental variables techniques. Using SHIW data they detect an increasing trend of 
educational wage premia from 1977 to 1995, mainly driven by the trend in the public 
sector. Naticchioni, Ricci and Rustichelli (2009) use the SHIW data for the period 1993-
2004 and quantile regressions to show that EWP in the private sector decline across the 
entire wage distribution, evidence that holds even when different robustness checks are 
carried out in order to deal with sample selection issues. Other related papers is 
Giustinelli (2004), which performs a quantile regression analysis on SHIW data from the 
beginning of the nineties to early 2000s, without addressing the issue of intertemporal 
comparison of EWP. 
 
3.  Data and Descriptive statistics 
The empirical analysis is based on the Survey of the Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) of 
the Bank of Italy, from 1993 to 2006. This database represents the main data source used 
in the literature to investigate inequality issues in Italy, as shown in the survey of the 
literature. We consider this time period for different reasons. First, because former 
periods have been widely covered in the literature. Second, because it is a homogenous 
institutional period, since the reforms of the wage setting in the private labour market in 
1992 and 1993 represented a breaking point for the Italian labour market.2  
                                                 
2  In 1992-1993 the reforms established two levels of collective bargaining, aiming at inducing wage 
moderation and a strengthening of the degree of centralization of the wage setting process. The first sectoral-
national level sets wage floors for each occupation at the national level for each sector, in order to maintain 
over time a stable purchasing power. The second level of bargaining takes place at the company level, or at a 
territorial level, and it should relate wages to the productivity dynamics. This two level bargaining system 
still applies in the Italian labour market. Moreover, other reforms were introduced in the labour market in 
1998 (“Pacchetto Treu”) and 2003 (“Legge 30 - Biagi”). These reforms did not concern the wage setting   7 
The sample consists of employees aged 18-64. We focus on employees with permanent 
jobs or with fixed term contracts (“contratti a tempo determinato” or “apprendistato”), 
while we do not consider atypical contracts introduced after the reforms in 1998 and 2003 
(“collaborazioni coordinate e continuative”, “contratti a progetto”), since we cannot 
identify these kinds of contracts in 1993 and since formally these workers are to be 
considered as self-employed.3 Further, we consider employees who have worked more 
than three months in the reference year and we drop 0.025% of the observations in both 
the right and left tail to cancel out potential outliers. We refer to the real monthly net 
wage, obtained by dividing the yearly wage from employment (including overtime, 
bonuses, and fringe benefits4), net of taxes and social security contributions, by the 
number of months worked in that year, and deflating by the consumer price index (base 
year 2004).5 Furthermore, we consider full-time equivalent individuals, controlling for 
differences in working time by taking into account the worked hours of part time 
workers. More specifically, we correct the monthly wage using a part-time share, 
computed comparing the number of worked hours by part-timers with respect to average 
full-time workers.6 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the main variables in 1993, 1995, 2002, 
2004, 2006, which are the waves we use in the analysis. The share of female increases 
monotonically over time, as expected. As for the educational levels, the share of 
graduates increases from 4% in 1993 to 9% in 2006, as well as the share of upper 
secondary workers increases from 33% to 47%. Instead, the shares of primary and lower 
secondary workers decrease over time. As far as the experience levels are concerned, the 
                                                                                                                                                   
system, as they were mainly focused on the increase of the hiring flexibility in the labour market, introducing 
new types of atypical temporary contracts. 
3 Formally these contracts are considered as self-employment contracts. However, they are often used by 
employers to replace dependent workers, because of the lower social security contributions. Note also that 
the share of these contracts is quite negligible in the SHIW data, being equal to 2.2% in 2004 in the private 
sector. These atypical contracts are usually characterized by low durations (few months) and low average 
wages (in the SHIW data in 2006 less than the 50% of the average wage of permanent contracts). 
4 In the US literature the fringe benefits include life and health insurances, vacation and sick leave, and they 
can be very relevant as a share of total wage. In Italy they are less widespread. This is because some of the 
benefits mentioned for the US are supplied by the State (health insurance) and others are fixed by national 
contracts (vacation and sick leave). In Italy usually the fringe benefits are made by employer-paid cars, 
luncheon vouchers, and some additional health services, such as the dental expenses, a health sector that in 
Italy is basically private. The correspondent value of money related to these benefits are computed and self-
declared by the employee. However, descriptive statistics do not change much when we do not consider this 
component of wages. 
5 Using hourly wages inequality trends are similar from a qualitative point of view. We prefer not to use 
hourly wages since the variable ‘hours worked’ is not totally reliable when compared to the one of the 
Labour Force Survey data (Istat).  
6 We define as employee in the private sector who is not employed in the public sector. The public employee 
is defined using two variables in the SHIW database, APSETT and DIMAZ.    8 
share of individuals with less than 15 years of experience decrease and, symmetrically, 
the share of those with more than 16 years of experience slightly increase. Table 1 also 
shows that average wages slightly decrease in 1995 and 1998 and then increase again in 
2006, similarly to the trend of the median wages. Interestingly, the 10th percentile 
substantially increases over time (13%) and the 90th percentile decreases slightly.   
As for the evolution over time of wage inequality in Italy, the literature pointed out 
that it has been quite stable from 1993 to 2002 (Brandolini, Cipollone, Sestito, 2002, Lilla 
2005, Boeri and Brandolini, 2004). However, these papers do not investigate separately 
the patterns of public and private sector, and do not make use of the SHIW last waves for 
2004 and 2006. In this section we point out that when considering only the private sector 
inequality trends change. As for the Gini index, it decreases by 15%, from 33.5 to 28.6, 
while the ratio between the 90th and the 10th percentile decreases by 13% from 1993 to 
2006, from 2.77 to 2.42.  
Useful insights can be also derived from the analysis of the changes in the different 
tails of the wage distribution. In particular, we can investigate the lower and the upper 
tail of the wage distribution analyzing the 50/10 and the 90/50 ratios. From Figure 1 it is 
possible to notice that the decrease in the 90/10 is associated to a decrease in both the 
90/50 and the 50/10. The fall in the 50/10 from 1993 to 2006 is greater (9%) than the fall 
in the 90/50 (4.5%). Furthermore, from Figure 1 it is possible to investigate the dynamics 
of inequality trend in the private sector. Actually, inequality started to increase 
immediately, already in 1995, then from 1998 to 2002 it has remained quite stable, and it 
decreased again from 2002 to 2006.  
In order to identify what are the forces that have played a role in explaining inequality 
trends in the private sector between 1993 and 2006 we carry out a decomposition 
analysis.  
 
4.  Quantile Regression Decomposition 
In this section we disentangle the contribution of labour force characteristics and labour 
market prices in the dynamics of the Italian wage structure. This literature goes back to 
the seminal contributions in 1973 by Oaxaca and by Blinder, and has seen great 
developments over the last three decades. One of the most recent contribution in this 
literature is to consider a quantile regression setting, which explores the dynamics of the 
whole wage distribution. We make use of a methodology that has been recently 
developed by Machado & Mata (2005), and extended by Melly (2005) and Autor et al.   9 
(2005), papers that use the same general idea and slightly different techniques in the 
implementation.  
This methodology takes as starting point the two quantile estimations for a given 
quantile in cross-section, for 1993 and 2006, using a standard Mincerian specification: 
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where  i=1,…n is the number of observations in each year t,  θ  is the quantile being 
analyzed,  ui is an idiosyncratic error term, and X represents our set of explanatory 
variable.  
Once having derived the quantile parameters  β(θ), this methodology allows to 
estimate the marginal distribution of wages as function both of the matrix X and of β(θ).7 
We implement this methodology using the SHIW Bank of Italy data, in 1993 and 2006. 
We consider the monthly real wages (in log) as dependent variable, and as covariates 
education, experience and gender.8 The fit of the estimation methodology is very 
accurate, as shown in Figure A1 in appendix. Since the marginal distribution of wages is 
now a function of the covariates and coefficients, it is possible to generate counterfactual 
densities, using different sets of X and β(θ). For instance, it would be possible to compute 
a counterfactual distribution keeping the covariates X at the 1993 level and coefficients 
β(θ) at the 2006 level.9  
Furthermore, since the Machado and Mata (2005) methodology did not explicitly build 
up a direct measure for a within-residual component, i.e. between observationally 
equivalent individuals, our reference now moves on to Autor et al. (2005) and Melly 
(2005), who extend the Machado-Mata approach to identify three separate components in 
the computation of counterfactual distribution: covariates, coefficients and residuals.  
Autor et al. (2005) and Melly (2005) define the coefficients component as a measure of 
between group inequality. In particular, following the notation of Melly (2005) and taking 
                                                 
7 See Appendix 1 for a detailed explanation of the estimate of the marginal distribution of wages. 
8 We implement 200 weighted quantile estimations on a regular grid, from 0 to 1 (0.005, 01, 015,…, 0.99, 
0.995), deriving the coefficients β(θ) along all the θ distribution. We then derive the unconditional wage 
distribution multiplying the full matrix of X by the matrix containing all quantile regression coefficients, as in 
Autor et al. (2005). Each element of the resulting matrix can be considered as drawn from the unconditional 
wage distribution. 
9 Note that all this literature, for instance Autor et al. (2005), Melly (2005, 2006), Machado and Mata (2005), 
make use of the partial equilibrium assumption that aggregate quantities of covariates do not affect labour 
market prices and vice versa. This assumption represents the major drawback of this research field.    10 
the median as a measure of the central tendency of the data, it is possible to derive the 
following wage equation for each year (1993 and 2006): 
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where βt(0.5) is the coefficients vector of the median regression in year t. To disentangle 
the effect of coefficients (between groups over time) from the effect of residuals (within 
group inequality) it is important to note from (2) that the θth quantile of the residual 
distribution of 
t
i u  conditionally on X is consistently estimated by  )) 5 . 0 ( ˆ ) ( ˆ (
t t X β θ β − . 
Accordingly, Melly (2005) defines the following vector of coefficients as a measure for the 
within component:  )) 5 . 0 ( ˆ ) ( ˆ ) 5 . 0 ( ˆ ( ) ( ˆ 93 93 06 93 , 06 β θ β β θ β − + =
r m , where the consistent 
estimate of the residual component given X, ( )) 5 . 0 ( ˆ ) ( ˆ 93 93 β θ β − , is added to the between 
component, ) 5 . 0 ( ˆ 06 β , in 2006. So doing we estimate the distribution that would have 
prevailed if the median return to characteristics had been the same as in 2006 but the 
residuals had been distributed as in 1993. 
Using counterfactual distributions generated by different sets of covariates and 
coefficients, Melly (2005) computes how the variations over time of some quantile q of the 
wage distribution is attributable to covariates, coefficients and residuals. In particular, 
denoting by  ) , ˆ ( ˆ 06 06 X q β the q quantile of the estimated distribution generated using the 
vector of coefficients 
06 ˆ β  and the set of covariates X06, Melly (2005) estimates the residual 
component as the difference, at the quantile q, of the two following estimated 
distributions,  ) , ˆ ( ˆ 06 06 X q β  and  ) , ˆ ( ˆ 06 93 , 06 X q
r m β , where the X and the βt(0.5) are constant at 
the 2006 level while the residual component is the only one that changes over time.10 
Similarly, the difference between  ) , ˆ ( ˆ 06 93 , 06 X q
r m β  and  ) , ˆ ( ˆ 06 93 X q β  is due to changes in 
coefficients since characteristics and residual are kept at the 2006 level.11 Finally, the 
difference between  ) , ˆ ( ˆ 06 93 X q β and  ) , ˆ ( ˆ
93 93 X q β  is due to changes of covariates.  
                                                 
10 It is worth noting that the difference for each quantile q between the two distributions  ) , ˆ ( ˆ 06 06 X q β  and 
) , ˆ ( ˆ 06 93 , 06 X q
r m β  can be easily rewritten in the following way: 
{ }   ) ), 5 . 0 ( ˆ ) ( ˆ ) 5 . 0 ˆ ( ˆ )) ), 5 . 0 ( ˆ ) ( ˆ ) 5 . 0 ( ˆ ( ˆ  
06 93 93 06 06 06 06 06 X q X q β θ β β β θ β β − + − − + , from which it comes out clearly that 
the only component that changes over time is the residual one. 
11 As in the previous note:  ) , ˆ ( ˆ 06 93 , 06 X q
r m β - ) , ˆ ( ˆ 06 93 X q β  =  ) ), 5 . 0 ( ˆ ) ( ˆ ) 5 . 0 ( ˆ ( ˆ 06 93 93 06 X q β θ β β − +  
) ), 5 . 0 ( ˆ ) ( ˆ ) 5 . 0 ( ˆ ( ˆ 06 93 93 93 X q β θ β β − + − .   11 
To sum up, adding and subtracting  ) , ˆ ( ˆ 06 93 X q β  and  ) , ˆ ( ˆ 06 93 , 06 X q
r m β  it is possible to 
decompose the variation over time of an estimated quantile of the wage distribution into 
the three components (residuals, coefficients, covariates), as follow:12  
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Similarly, it is also possible to decompose the variations of any inequality index we are 
interested in, such as the ratios 90/10, 90/50, 50/10.13 
 
5.   Quantile decomposition results 
Table 2 displays the results of the quantile decomposition in the private sector, derived 
using a Mincerian equation with gender, education and experience as covariates.14 To 
interpret the figures of table 2 it is worth noting that the variation over time of selected 
quantiles (10, 25, 50, 75, 90) are to be considered as the differences of two logarithms, i.e. 
percentage change over the period. Panel A of table 2 shows that from 1993 to 2006 the 
median of the estimated distribution increases by 2.9% over time, the first decile 
increased by 12.5% while the 90th percentile decreased by 2.2%. Using the decomposition 
methodology we can identify the driving forces behind these changes of the wage 
structure. The coefficients component turns out to be the one that changes the most along 
the wage distribution: from -2.5% at the 10th percentile to a -12% at the 90th, 
monotonically. As for the covariates component, it is positive and constant across the 
wage distribution. This simply means that the increase in education and experience in the 
                                                 
12 Note that the sum of the three components exactly amounts to the estimated variation over time of that 
given quantile. This property is not shared with other methodology previously adopted. 
13 It is worth noting that this decomposition analysis suffers from the standard critic related to the order of 
the decomposition, i.e. it would be possible to derive others counterfactual distributions ending up with 
different coefficients, covariates and residual effects. In other words, the order is arbitrary. We have chosen 
the same order as in Melly (2005) and Autor et al. (2005). Moreover, note also that other methodologies that 
compute the residual component have to assume independent error terms, as in the case of Juhn, Murphy 
and Pearce (1993). Methods based on quantile regressions can instead account for heteroscedasticity. This is 
actually crucial when the variance of the residuals expands as a function of education and experience 
(Lemieux, 2002) and when the population gets more educated and experienced, as in the Italian case.  
14 It is worth pointing out that it is possible to estimates the coefficients for education at all quantile of the 
distribution, meaning that there are graduates in the lower part of the distribution and workers with low 
educational levels at the top of the wage distribution.   12 
workforce would have shifted to the right the wage distribution, given fixed the two 
other components. Further, the within component displays an asymmetric impact on the 
wage distribution, being positive in the lower quantiles (4.7% at the 10th and 2.3% at the 
25th) and negative in the upper quantiles (-1.7% at the 75th and -1% at 90th).  
The interplay between these forces determines the changes in the wage structure at 
selected quantiles. In particular, below the median wage the negative impact of the 
coefficients component is dominated by the positive impact of the covariates component, 
which is also strengthened by the positive residual component. Above the median wage, 
on the contrary, the strong negative coefficients component, which is also reinforced by 
the negative residual component, dominates the positive covariates component.  
In Panel B and C of Table 2 we report the same decomposition analysis for the periods 
1993-2004 and 1993-2002, for mainly two reasons. First, in order to show that our analysis 
concerning the period 1993-2006 is robust to the choice of the period, i.e. the behaviour of 
the three decomposition components are qualitatively very similar in the three panels.15 
Second, to have a better understanding of the dynamics of the different percentiles of the 
distribution.16 
These over time variations at selected quantiles help to understand the dynamic of 
wage inequality. Actually, the standard inequality ratios (90/10, 90/50, 50/10) can be 
easily derived from Table 2, computing the related differences, both for the estimated 
variations and for the three decomposition components.  
Table 3 shows the trends of the inequality indexes for the periods 1993-2002, 1993-2004 
and 1993-2006. As for the period 1993-2006 the falling of the overall 90/10 ratio of wage 
inequality (-14.7%) is concentrated more in the lower part of the distribution (-9.5%) than 
in the upper tail (5.1%). The analysis of the three components reported in Table 3 shows 
that the 90/10 ratio reduction observed in the private sector is mainly driven by the 
negative coefficients component (65%), and to a lesser extent by the negative residual 
component (39%), while the covariates component is negligible. The 50/10 decrease is 
instead equally driven by the coefficients (48%) and the residual components (49%), 
while the 90/50 is strongly related to the negative coefficients component (95%).  
                                                 
15 Further, as expected, the covariates component increases from the period 1993-2002 to the period 1993-
2006, since the share of educated and experienced workers raises. 
16 The 10th percentile strongly increases over time, as already stressed in the descriptive statistics section. 
Table 2 shows that this increase in manly due to a change in the negative coefficients component (from -7.4% 
in panel C to -2.5% in panel A) and to an increase in both the covariates and residual components.   13 
As far as the negative coefficients component is concerned, it is consistent with the 
falling educational wage premia observed in Italy over the period 1993-2004 along the 
whole wage distribution (Naticchioni, Ricci, Rustichelli 2008).
17 Since the coefficients 
component is derived comparing median coefficients in 1993 and 2006 for each group, it 
can be considered as a measure of the change over time of the coefficients of the chosen 
covariates, in our case mainly education. Returns to experience, on the other hand, have 
not changed much over time.18 Results for the period 1993-2002 and 1993-2004 are very 
similar from a qualitative point of view (Table 3).  
 
6.  Explanations for the Italian wage inequality trends   
6.1.  Explanations for the trends of the upper tail of the wage distribution (the 90/50) 
In this section we set out to address the explanations for the changes in the upper tail of 
the wage distribution and for the related findings of the decomposition analysis. We 
showed that the decrease of the 90/50 ratio is associated to the negative coefficients 
component, and this is in turn related to the falling EWP observed in Italy. As a first 
possible explanation we analyses whether the changes in the job quality distribution 
might have played a role in explaining the decreasing 90/50 ratio. Autor et al. (2006), 
Goos and Manning (2006), Dustmann et al. (2008) show that changes in the job quality 
distribution can at least partially account for the increasing wage inequality trends in the 
US, the UK and Germany. Autor et al. (2006), Goos and Manning (2006), Dustmann et al. 
(2008) claim that in the last decade technologies have been more substitute to routine 
jobs, which are located at the middle of the job quality distribution, complement to non-
routine tasks, and uncorrelated to manual tasks, which are located at the top and the 
bottom of the wage distribution, respectively. In this framework, the new technologies 
can account for the increase in the upper tail wage inequality (the 90/50 ratio) and for the 
decrease of the lower tail inequality (the 50/10 ratio). Further, Goos et al. (2009) find out 
job polarization trends in most of the European countries, using data from the European 
Labour Force Survey data (ELFS).  
We apply the same kind of analysis as in Autor et al. (2006), Goos and Manning (2006), 
Dustmann et al. (2008), Goos et al (2009), to the Italian case, in order to verify whether the 
                                                 
17 The results of Naticchioni, Ricci, Rustichelli (2009) holds using both a continuous and a dummy 
specification for education, and are robust to several robustness checks (different econometric specifications, 
different population subgroups). Note that also Peracchi (2006) derived falling EWP for Italy, using ECHP 
data and OLS estimates.  
18 Actually, from 1993 to 2006 returns to experience decreased but in a not significant way, as well as the 
intercept of the estimated equation, while the coefficient for the gender variable has increased over time.   14 
changes in wage inequality can be related to changes in the quality of jobs offered by 
firm. We use the same data as Goos et al (2009), the ELFS, for the same years (1993 and 
2006) for Italy. Consistently with our analysis, we focus on the private sector, while Goos 
et at (2009) considered both public and private sector employees. As in Goos et al (2009) 
employment is measured as usual weekly hours worked, but similar results can be 
obtained when using the alternative definition of persons employed. According to the 
ISCO classification we divide the occupations in three main categories: skilled (ISCO 1-3), 
medium-skilled (ISCO 4-8), unskilled (ISCO 9).19   
In Table 4 we report the shares of the amount of hours worked in skilled, medium-
skilled and unskilled occupations in 1993 and 2006, and the related variation over time. It 
is worth noting that skilled occupation increase by 5.8 percentage points, medium-skilled 
occupations (proxy for routine occupations) decrease by 5.0 percentage points, and 
unskilled occupations decrease only slightly (-0.8 percentage points).20 These findings are 
consistent with the polarization patterns observed by Goos et al (2009) for Europe: the 
share of routine occupations decreased more than those of unskilled and, especially, of 
skilled occupations.  
Nonetheless, these polarization patterns contribute only partially to explain our wage 
inequality patterns. The increase in the 10th percentile of wages, with respect to the 
median, can be related to the greater drop in the share of routine occupations -located in 
the middle of the wage distribution- with respect to the basically stability of the share of 
unskilled occupations. Hence, the changes in the occupations shares can address –at least 
partially- the evolution of the 50/10 ratio, as we will discuss in the next paragraph. 
However, the decrease in the 90/50 ratio can hardly be related to the increase in the share 
of skilled occupations and to the drop in the demand for medium-skilled occupations. To 
investigate further this issue we go on to analyse the labour demand for educated 
workers, to check whether the increase in skilled occupations has matched the increase in 
the supply of educated workers. We then compute how graduates are allocated in skilled, 
medium-skilled, and unskilled occupations, and the variations of these shares from 1993 
to 2006. Table 5 shows that the share of graduates employed in skilled occupations 
                                                 
19 Goos et al (2009) compute the three categories ranking the occupations by average wages. Comparing our 
classification to the one of Goos et al (2009), the occupations included in the skilled category are basically the 
same, while the occupations in the medium-skilled and the unskilled differs slightly.   
20 Note that there has been a structural change in the Italian LFS in 2004. However, the structural break 
should not produce any relevant bias when the analysis is focused on dependent workers, since the main 
differences between the old and the new survey regard mainly the efficacy in capturing new forms of 
employment relations, mainly atypical contracts (not considered in our analysis). As a robustness check we 
computed the same analysis for the period 1993-2003, and results are very similar.    15 
decreased by 6.2%, from 79.8% to 73.6%, while it increases in the medium-skilled (4.7%) 
and unskilled occupations (1.5%).21 
It is hard to believe that this evidence be related to a faster increase of the demand for 
skills (education) at the bottom than at the top of the job quality distribution. A wide and 
robust international evidence shows that educated workers are more complementary to 
skilled than to unskilled jobs. Ruling out this explanation, we claim that graduates 
entering the labour markets in recent years might have been willing to accept jobs at the 
bottom or at the middle of the job quality distribution because the demand for graduate 
workers has not increased over time at the same pace as the supply of education.  
 
6.1.1.  The role of supply-demand interactions 
The findings of the previous section suggest that the interactions between demand and 
supply can account for wage inequality patterns in Italy. Put it differently, one might 
argue that the increase in educational levels of the labour supply from 1993 to 2006 has 
been faster than the increase in the demand for education, and this might have generated 
the reduction in the EWP that in turn represents the driving force of the fall in wage 
inequality, especially in the upper tail of the distribution. It is worth noting that actually 
the increase in the supply of education has been impressive, since the share of workers 
with an upper secondary degree increased from 33% to 47% and the share of graduates -
although still very low when compared to OECD countries- more than doubled, from 4% 
to 9%.  
To address if and how much the interactions between demand and supply have 
played a role we implement the methodology proposed by Card and Lemieux (2001), 
which makes use of aggregate CES production function with two types of labour inputs, 
skilled and unskilled labour. The aggregate output in period t is given by: 
 
 (3)      () ρ ρ ρ θ θ
1
, , t t L t t H t L H Y ⋅ + ⋅ =  
 
where the parameters  t H, θ  and  t L, θ  represent the efficiency of skilled and unskilled, 
respectively, Ht is the aggregate labour input of skilled and Lt is the aggregate labour 
                                                 
21 Similar patterns of are observed by Goos and Manning (2007) in the UK, in which some educated workers 
are forced into the low-skill jobs at the bottom end of the job quality distribution.   16 
input of unskilled labour in year t. The elasticity of substitution  E σ  between the two 








We also exploit the experience and gender information in our dataset, dividing the 
sample of skilled and unskilled workers into 14 groups (7 experience classes and gender), 
for each wave (1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006).22 As in Card and Lemieux (2001) 
we assume that aggregate inputs depend on two nested CES of skilled and unskilled 
labour: 
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where the index j represents each experience-gender group, the parameters  j α  and  j β  
are efficiency parameters, which are assumed to be time invariant, Hj,t and Lj,t are group 
specific supplies of skilled and unskilled labour in each period t. The elasticity of 







A . In this 
framework it is then possible to take into account two different elasticities of substitution, 
the one between skilled and unskilled and the one among experience-gender groups 
(within each educational level).  
The firm profit maximization requires that the relative wages of different skill groups 
are equal to their relative marginal products, i.e., the (log) ratio of the skilled/unskilled 
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22 With respect to the 8 experience groups used so far, we only drop those with experience higher than 35 
years, because for them the share of graduate individuals is often very close to zero.    17 
where  t j e ,  is the error term in the empirical specification of the firm-maximization 
condition. According to this model, the skilled-unskilled wage gap for a given gender-
experience group j depends on both the aggregate relative supply of skilled labour (Ht/Lt) 
in period t, and on the experience-gender specific relative supply of skilled labour 
(Hj,t\Lj,t). As in Card and Lemieux (2001) we approximate the term log(θHt/θLt) with a 
linear trend, since it does not depend on j, and the terms log(βj/αj) with experience-gender 
dummies, since they do not depend on t. 
It is worth pointing out that, on the one hand, equation (8) nests the conventional 
specification used by Katz and Murphy (1992) that assumes perfect substitution across 
groups with the same level of education ( +∞ → A σ ). In this latter case the term 
[log(Hj,t/Lj,t) – log(Ht/Lt)] drops and the skilled-unskilled wage gap depends only on the 
aggregate relative supply of skilled workers in t (Ht\Lt), the time trend and the group 
dummies. On the other hand, we also estimate equation (6) by assuming imperfect 
substitution between experience-gender groups, regressing the relative wage of college 
workers for each gender-experience group on the aggregate supply index, log(Ht/Lt), and 
on the deviation between the gender-experience group supply and the aggregate supply, 
i.e. [log(Hj,t/Lj,t) – log(Ht/Lt)], always including time trend and group dummies. The 
coefficient associated to this variable provides an estimate of  A σ / 1 , while the coefficient 
associated to the log(Ht/Lt) is the inverse of the elasticity of substitution between the two 
educational groups, i.e.  E σ . 
In the empirical specification we define as skilled the graduates and as unskilled all 
workers with less than a university degree. In column (1) of Table 6 we give the results 
for the case where the elasticity of substitution across experience-gender groups be 
infinite, i.e. they are perfect substitutes. In column (2) we allow for the groups to be 
imperfect substitutes. Actually σE does not change much in the two estimations, probably 
because the elasticity across groups is not statistically different from zero in column (2). 
The value of σE is hence equal to 3 in column (2) and to 2.8 in column (1).23  
                                                 
23 Actually we implement this methodology as in Autor, Katz, Kearney (2008), using a one step estimation. 
Instead, Card and Lemieux (2001) make use of a two steps procedure to estimate in the first step the 
parameters α, β, σA , in such a way to derive the amount of Ht and Lt in terms of efficiency units, as in equation 
(4) and (5). Using the two steps procedure the estimate of σE is slightly higher, around 4. Furthermore, in our 
analysis we define Ht, Hj,t, Lt, and Hj,t, using the (weighted) absolute number of workers. Actually, Card and 
Lemieux (2001) exploit the information concerning the worked hours. For this reason we implement a further 
robustness check in which we weighs the number of workers by the number of months and hours worked in 
that year. The estimate of σE is still around 4. Finally, we also implemented the methodology of Manacorda, 
Manning, Wadsworth (2006), which allows to have three separate elasticities of substitution, one between 
skilled and unskilled labour, one among the experience groups, and another one between men and women   18 
This value for σE is very high when compared to the US case, where it ranges between 
1.4 and 2 (Acemoglu, 2002), while it is lower than the value of 5 for Germany (Dustmann 
et al., 2008).24 These findings suggest that the changes over time in relative supply affect 
negatively relative wages, entailing a fall in the EWP that in turn drives the fall of the 
90/50. Even more importantly, the linear trend coefficient, which is the proxy for the 
skill-biased technical change -and hence in a sense for the demand for skilled workers-  is 
not statistically different from zero. Combining the two effects, it is possible to claim that 
relative wages between skilled and unskilled decreased over time because they are 
negatively affected by the changes in the supply of education. 
According to these findings, one might wonder why demand for skilled has not 
increased in Italy at the same pace as in other OECD countries. This analysis is beyond 
the goals of this paper. Nonetheless, it does not represent an unexpected finding once one 
takes into account the data concerning technology improvements in the OECD countries. 
The OECD (2001) states that in 1996 the share of capital stock accounted for by ICT goods 
was about 2% in Italy, 3% in West Germany and France, 5% in UK and more than 7% in 
the US. Moreover, the gap with fast adopter countries increased over time, since the 
1990s: the yearly growth rate of ICT investments in the period 1996-1999 was 23% in US, 
22% in France and only 15% in Italy and Germany. Further, the expenditures in R&D in 
the private sector, as a percentage of the production at current prices, decreased from 
0.98% in 1991 to 0.68% in 2003 in the Italian manufacturing, while in France the same 
ratio have been stable around 2.3%, in Germany around 2.7%, and about 3% in the US 
and Japan (OECD STAN database). Moreover, it is also important to take into account 
other related peculiar factors characterizing the Italian economy, i.e. the specialization in 
traditional sectors (Matano and Naticchioni, 2008), the family based corporate 




                                                                                                                                                   
(in each experience group). However, results do not change much, since the additional elasticity of 
substitution between men and women is very high (higher than 10). 
24 Actually, Dustmann et al. (2008) carry out an analysis based on three types of skills (low, medium and 
high). However, they show that when imposing the same elasticity of substitution between high vs. medium 
skills and medium vs. low skills the value of σ is equal to 5.5. Dustmann et al. (2008) claim that this high 
value of σE might depend on the presence of unions and other institutions in the labour market, which are 
still much stronger in Germany than in the US, that make wages less responsive to supply and demand 
shocks. A similar explanation might hold for the Italian case as well. Furthermore, the R-square is equal to 
0.44 suggesting that the supply demand explanation explain almost half of the total variance of relative 
wages.   19 
6.2.  Explanations for the lower part of the distribution (the 50/10 ratio) 
The 50/10 ratio decreased by 9% from 1993 to 2006, and the decomposition analysis 
pointed out that this reduction can be accounted for by the negative coefficients 
component (48%) and by the residual component (49%). The negative coefficients 
component can be related to supply-demand interactions, as shown in the previous 
section. To provide an interpretation for the residual-within component, we resort to 
Lemieux (2002, 2006), which argue that educated and experienced workers display higher 
levels of wage dispersion and that their employment share increase over time in all 
OECD countries. Hence, according to Lemieux (2002, 2006) the increase of the residual 
component at the 10th percentile of the wage distribution can be related to the increase of 
the shares of educated and experienced workers, characterized by a higher dispersion: 
the so called composition effect.   
Moreover, we also claim that other two factors have at least partially affected the 
decrease in the 50/10 ratio. The first factor concerns, as already stressed in the previous 
paragraph, the changes in the job quality distribution offered by firms, since the demand 
for medium-skilled occupations decreased more than the demand for unskilled workers, 
and this is consistent with a decrease in the 50/10 ratio. 
The second factor regards the fact that SHIW data contains only information about net 
wages. Under the hypothesis that tax regimes have not changed over time our results 
would remain unaffected. However, this hypothesis can hardly hold, since from 1998 
various tax reforms have been implemented in Italy. In particular, the declared purpose 
of the legislator in the last decade was to favour the individuals at the bottom of the 
distribution, by means of changes in the income brackets, household oriented policies 
and especially with the introduction in 2003 of a no-tax area.25 Martone (2008) computed 
simulations of the effective average tax rates for two widespread typologies of dependent 
earners in the labour market: single individual and married worker with two children 
(table 7). The time span considered by Martone (2008) is 1998-2006, since before 1998 
changes in the tax system had been negligible. The analysis of Martone (2008) confirms 
that tax reforms have mainly affected the lower tail of the distribution. In particular, 
according to the simulation concerning a married individual with two children the 
effective average tax rate decreased strongly, especially for labour incomes lower than 
25000 euros, while for individual in the upper tail of the wage distribution differences 
over time in effective average tax rate are much lower, especially for earners beyond 
                                                 
25 The no-tax area is structured such that a dependent workers earning less than 7.500 euros does not pay 
taxes. For income between 7.500 and 33.500 there is decreasing tax deduction.    20 
40.000 euros. As for single individuals similar patters applies: effective average tax rates 
decreased especially in the lower tail of the wage distribution (below 20.000 euros) while 
their reduction is very small in magnitude at the top of the wage distribution. In 
accordance with this evidence it is then possible to argue that the increase in the 10th 
percentile of net wages from 1993 to 2006 is at least partially related to a reduction in the 
effective average tax rate, while changes in the upper tail of the distribution are not 
affected by changes in tax regimes.  
 
It is also worth noting that in this section we do not rely on explanations based on the 
role of institutions (employment protection legislation, unions power, centralized wage 
setting) because of the waves of flexibility policies introduced in Italy in the nineties and 
in the early 2000s. As shown by the OECD index of employment protection (OCED, 1994, 
2004), the rigidity of the Italian labour market decreased in the last fifteen years, and this 
should have exerted a pressure toward the widening, rather than a compression, of 
inequality, especially at the bottom of the wage distribution.26 
 
7.  Conclusion 
This paper shows that the Italian case is an outlier in the literature concerning wage 
inequality trends. The starting point of the analysis is that wage inequality decreased 
from 1993 to 2006 in the Italian private sector, both in the upper and the lower part of the 
distribution. To investigate the forces that have generated these inequality trends we 
carry out a quantile decomposition analysis to identify three main components, related to 
coefficients, covariates and residuals. The decomposition analysis shows that the 
d e c r e a s e  i n  t h e  9 0 / 5 0  r a t i o  i s  m a i n l y  d r i v e n  b y  t h e  n e g a t i v e  c o e f f i c i e n t s  c o m p o n e n t ,  
while the decrease in the 50/10 ratio is related to both a negative coefficients components 
and a residual component.  
As for possible explanations for our findings we claim that the decrease in the 90/50 
ratio has to be mainly related to the decrease over time in EWP, in turn caused by supply-
demand interactions, and not to the changes in the quality distribution of jobs offered by 
firms. As for the decrease in the 50/10 ratio, we identify three main explanations: a) the 
composition effect (Lemieux, 2002, 2006), which drives the residual components derived 
                                                 
26 This is also confirmed by Manacorda (2004) who shows that the abolition of the wage indexation 
mechanism (in 1992) generated an increase in wage inequality, which mainly tooks place at the beginning of 
the nineties.   21 
using the decomposition analysis: the increase in the share of educated workers at the 
bottom of the wage distribution might have increased the residual component that is one 
the driving force of the increase of the wages at the 10th percentile; b) the changes in the 
job quality distribution offered by firms since the reduction in demand in medium-skilled 
occupations is much stronger than the one occurred for unskilled occupations;  c) the 
changes in the tax regimes: Martone (2008) shows that in the period of analysis the 
effective tax rate decreased strongly for workers at the bottom of the wage distribution, 
while they remained stable (or slightly decreasing) for the rest of the distribution. Hence, 
the reduction in the 50/10 ratio might at least partially be related to changes in the tax 
regimes.   22 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: SHIW Sample descriptives. Private Sector.
1993 1995 2002 2004 2006
Share of Female 0.33 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.39
Education
Primary - no school 0.18 0.16 0.09 0.09 0.05
Lower secondary 0.45 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.38
Upper secondary 0.33 0.39 0.44 0.45 0.47
Univ. Degree or higher 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.09
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Experience (year)
eps1   -       0-5 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.13
eps2   -       6-10 0.13 0.16 0.12 0.13 0.13
eps3   -     11-15 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.13
eps4   -     16-20 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.17
eps5   -     21-25 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.15
eps6   -     26-30 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12
eps7   -     31-35 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.09
eps8   -      >36 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.09
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Net Wages (Monthly)
Mean 1318 1255 1295 1304 1356
10th percentile 723 722 750 775 822
50th percentile 1177 1104 1165 1195 1224
90th percentile 2006 1930 1916 1933 1994
Observations 4052 3798 4195 4341 4386
Note: 0.025% of the observation in the right and left tails dropped. Weight: pesofl.  
 
Δ p10 Δ p25 Δ p50 Δ p75 Δ p90
Panel A
Total estimated variation 12.5 7.4 2.9 -1.2 -2.2
Coefficients  -2.5 -4.5 -7.1 -9.8 -12.0
Covariates  10.3 9.6 10.0 10.2 10.7
Residual   4.7 2.3 0.0 -1.7 -1.0
Panel B
Total estimated variation 6.3 3.4 0.0 -3.7 -5.5
Coefficients (between) -4.8 -6.2 -8.6 -10.7 -13.4
Covariates  8.5 8.7 8.7 9.0 9.2
Residual  2.6 1.0 -0.1 -2.0 -1.2
Panel C
Total estimated variation 3.6 -0.5 -2.7 -5.0 -4.9
Coefficients  -7.4 -7.6 -10.0 -11.3 -14.0
Covariates  7.6 6.8 7.0 6.7 7.5
Residual   3.4 0.3 0.3 -0.3 1.5
Source: SHIW data. 
Variations at selected quantiles - 1993-2004
Variations at selected quantiles - 1993-2006
Table 2. Total observed variations (in percentage points) at selected quantiles and
quantile decomposition into the coefficients, covariates and residuals components
in the private sector.
Variations at selected quantiles - 1993-2002






Total estimated variation -14.7 -9.6 -5.1
Coefficients contribution -9.5 -4.6 -4.8
64% 48% 95%
Covariates contribution 0.5 -0.3 0.7
-3% 3% -15%
Residual contribution  -5.7 -4.7 -1.0
39% 49% 19%
90/10 50/10 90/50
Total estimated variation -11.7 -6.3 -5.4
Coefficients contribution -8.7 -3.8 -4.8
74% 61% 89%
Covariates contribution 0.6 0.2 0.4
-5% -4% -8%
Residual contribution  -3.73 -2.69 -1.04
32% 43% 19%
90/10 50/10 90/50
Total estimated variation -8.5 -6.4 -2.2
Coefficients contribution  -6.5 -2.6 -4.0
77% 41% 183%
Covariates contribution -0.1 -0.6 0.6
1% 10% -26%
Residual contribution  -1.9 -3.1 1.2
22% 49% -57%
Source: SHIW data. 
Table 3. Decomposition of the inequality indexes into the between, within



















Data: Italian Labour Force Survey.
Share  2006
Variation in % points
Table 4: Shares of the total number of hours worked in skilled,
medium-skilled, and unskilled occupatons, in 1993 and 2006, and















Data: Italian Labour Force Survey
Variation in % points
Table 5: Share of the hours worked by graduates in skilled, medium-
skilled, e unskilled occupations in 1993 and 2006, and the related







Table 6. The role of the supply-demand explanation
Covariates Coeff p-value Coef p-value 
 log(Ht/Lt)   -0.358 0.003 -0.337 0.004
[log(Hj,t/Lj,t) –log(Ht/Lt)]   - - -0.076 0.269





SHIW Bank of Italy data. Sample size: 98 observations.
(1) perf. Substitut. 
among groups 
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Table 7. Trends in effective average tax rate from 1998 to 2006
Euros 1998 2006 1998 2006
10000 11.6 7.1 -29.5 -30.1
15000 17.0 14.7 -5.6 -16.3
20000 20.0 18.4 8.1 -0.3
25000 22.7 20.7 15.8 9.9
30000 24.7 22.9 20.2 14.6
40000 27.7 27.1 24.5 20.9
50000 30.2 29.5 28.2 26.0
75000 33.6 32.6 32.3 31.9
100000 35.9 34.2 35.0 34.2
Simulations computed in Martone (2008), using real wages. 
Dependent employees














1990 1995 2000 2005
anno
90/10 Private Sec. 50/10 Private Sec.
90/50 Private Sec.
Period 1993-2006
Figure 1. 90/10, 50/10, 90/50 indexes in the private sector
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APPENDIX: The Machado-Mata decomposition 
This methodology takes as starting point the two quantile estimations in cross-section, for 
1993 and 2006, using a Mincerian standard specification: 






i u X w θ θ β , ) ( ln + =   
where  i=1,…n is the number of observations in each year t,  θ  is the quantile being 
analyzed,  ui is an idiosyncratic error term, and X represents our set of explanatory 
variable that, according to the Mincerian specification, includes education, experience 
and gender.  As standard in this literature (Koenker and Basset, 1978), β(θ) can be 
estimated minimizing the following expression: 
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Once having derived the quantile parameters  β(θ), this methodology allows to 
estimate the marginal distribution of wages as function of both X and β(θ), and to derive 
counterfactual distributions of wages. 
 
Estimation of the marginal distribution of wages 
This methodology is essentially developed in two main parts. In the first part, the 
conditional quantile distribution is estimated, Qθ(w|Xi), for all θ given the set of 
covariates X. More specifically, quantile regression theory has shown that, using a linear 
specification, the conditional quantile distribution of wages can be defined as: 
(3A)     ) 1 , 0 (   all for       ) ( ) | ( ∈ = θ θ β θ i i X X w Q  
where Xi is a vector for the set of covariates. Basset and Koenker (1982) showed that, 
under some regularity conditions, the estimated conditional quantile function is a 
consistent estimator of the population conditional quantile function, uniformly in θ.27 
It is then possible to use the estimated parameters to simulate the conditional 
distribution of w given X, using an application of the probability integral transformation 
theorem: if V is a uniform random variable on [0,1], then F-1(V) has distribution F. In our 
case, if θ1, θ2,… θj,…, θJ, are drawn from a uniform (0,1), the corresponding j estimates of 
the conditional quantile at Xi,  { }
J
j j i i X w
1 ) ( ˆ   ˆ
= ≡ θ β , constitute a random sample from the 
estimated conditional distribution of wages given Xi. Using this procedure, we can 
estimate the conditional distribution of wages for all the different combination of X.  
The second part of the procedure consists in deriving an estimation of the marginal 
distribution of wages. Following Machado & Mata (2005) and Autor, Katz, Kerney (2005), 
the marginal density of wages depends upon both the conditional quantile function, 
                                                 
27 To validate the heteroscedasticity hypothesis, i.e. the fact that ‘slope coefficients’ are different for the same 
covariate across quantiles, we successfully test in this paper that the estimates of the coefficient vectors at 
different quantiles are statistically different from one another (Koenker and Basset, 1978).   29 
) ( ˆ ) | ( j i i X X w Q θ β θ =  for given Xi and θj, and the distribution of the covariates, g(X). In 
order to derive a random sample from the marginal density of wages, it is possible to 
multiply the matrix containing random observations (or all the observations) from g(X) 
times the matrix of β(θj), with j=1,…,J, in which the different θj are randomly chosen from 
the uniform (0,1) distribution. In this setting, each observation of the resulting matrix, 
} {
N i
J j j i i X w
,..., 1
,..., 1 ) ( ˆ ˆ
=
= ≡ θ β , can be considered as drawn from the estimated marginal 
distribution of wages.28  
By applying this procedure, it is possible to draw an arbitrarily large random sample 
from the marginal distribution of wages. Autor, Katz, Kearney (2005) claim that this 
procedure can be considered as equivalent to numerically integrating the estimated 
conditional quantile function  ) | ( ˆ X w Qθ  over the distribution of X and θ, i.e. 
X X g X w Q
X
∂ ∂ ∫∫   ) ( ) | ( ˆ θ
θ
θ , integral that produces a consistent estimator of the marginal 





The insights behind the comparison between the Machado & Mata approach and the 
integral procedure are quite intuitive. More specifically, any given random observation of 
Xi  is multiplied by all the possible β(θ), with  θ ranging from 0 to 1, and this can be 
considered as the internal integration over the support of θ. Then, X is repeatedly drawn 
from the whole support g(X), and this can be seen as the external integral in X. Melly 
(2006) shows that the Machado and Mata (2005) estimator and the integration procedure 
produce the same results when both the sample size and the number of quantiles chosen 




                                                 
28 Note that instead of drawing observations from g(X) we consider the whole X matrix, as in Autor et al. 
(2005). Further, we do not consider, as in Machado and Mata (2005), only the elements on the diagonal of the 
resulting matrix generated by  } {
J j
N i j i i X w
.,., 1
,.., 1 ) ( ˆ   ˆ
=
= ≡ θ β , but all the matrix. This means that we produce a 
much larger set of simulated values for the unconditional wage distribution (200 times larger), as in Autor et 
al. (2005). In this paper we implement 200 weighted quantile estimations on a regular grid, from 0 to 1 (0.005, 
01, 015,…, 0.99, 0.995), deriving the coefficients β(θ) along all the θ distribution. We then derive the 
unconditional wage distribution multiplying the full matrix of X by the matrix containing all quantile 
regression coefficients, as in Autor et al. (2005). Each element of the resulting matrix can be considered as 
drawn from the unconditional wage distribution. 
￿ Note that θ is uniformly distributed on the [0,1] interval, implying that the relative density f(θ) is equal to 1.  
dx d x g x w Q dx x g x w f dx x w f w f
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure A1. Fit of the estimation methodology of Machado and 
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